Security

What we protect against

Listening. Bluetooth is radio; anyone nearby can receive it. Every Flux Drive transfer is encrypted end to end, with fresh keys for every session. A listener records noise.

Impersonation. A stranger's phone cannot send plans to your drive, and your phone will refuse to talk to a drive that has been swapped or tampered with. Both ends must prove they hold the operator's pairing key before a single byte of the plan moves — a check that works both ways.

Injection. The drive only accepts files whose names match the FMS flight-plan set, over an authenticated session. It cannot be used to carry documents, software, or anything else into the cockpit. Firmware maintenance commands require the same authentication, so the drive cannot be knocked offline or reflashed over the air by a bystander.

Theft of the drive. This is the part we are proudest of. The plan simply is not there:

• Ten minutes after the FMS stops reading, the plan is destroyed — a raw erase of the whole storage, not a file delete. While the FMS is still reading (or retrying, as they do), the plan stays put.
• Every power-up destroys whatever is on the drive before the USB port even wakes up. A drive unplugged from the aircraft and plugged into a laptop mounts empty. Always.
• The app can also command an immediate wipe over an authenticated session.

“Destroyed” here means forensically erased: every storage block is physically erased, including the housekeeping data underneath the filesystem. There is nothing to recover, even with the memory chip removed from the board.

What we deliberately did not do

No online accounts, no cloud relay, no tracking. The plan travels once, encrypted, across the flight deck — from a phone in the operator's crew to a drive in the operator's aircraft — and then it ceases to exist. TecAv never sees it.

And no lights or buttons on the drive itself. To the naked eye it does nothing at all, which in the wrong hands is exactly the right amount of information.

A detailed technical security summary — algorithms, key handling, and the at-rest erase design — is available to operators and their security reviewers on request at support@tecav.com.au.